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ABSTRACT 
The emergence of complex, global supply chains has imperiled 
the rights of workers across the globe. Attempts to protect workers’ 
rights through traditional forms of private regulation, namely 
Corporate Social Responsibility codes (“CSRs”) and Multi-
Stakeholder Initiatives (“MSIs”), have failed due to a lack of 
enforceability and a lack of worker involvement. However, a new 
model of private regulation, Worker Driven Social Responsibility 
(“WSR”) Agreements has succeeded where CSRs and MSIs have failed. 
WSR Agreements have emerged as a form of enforceable private 
regulation, created with worker involvement, which have concretely 
protected the rights of workers. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the 1990s, local activists informed United States 
Department of Justice officials that tomato growers in the town of 
Immokalee, Florida held their employees in labor camps against 
their will and used corporal punishment, such as beatings, 
shootings, and pistol-whippings, to ensure that these workers 
2020] WORKER DRIVEN AGREEMENTS 541 
harvested tomatoes.1 One Justice Department official, in reference 
to Immokalee, called Florida “ground zero for modern slavery.”2 
About fifteen years later, on April 24, 2013, in Dhaka, Bangladesh, 
Rana Plaza, a building that housed five garment factories, 
collapsed.3 Despite widespread concerns that the building was 
unsafe, economic necessity forced at least 3,122 garment 
employees into dangerous working conditions on the day it 
collapsed.4 Over 1,100 workers died.5 
Though separated by time and space, the situations of the 
Immokalee farmworkers and the Rana Plaza garment workers are 
not so different: both groups of workers worked in corporate 
supply chains6 and both groups of workers were unable to avail 
themselves of local labor laws.7 In response to these realities, both 
groups engaged in labor organizing that went beyond the 
traditional union model and reshaped the notion of corporate 
social responsibility.8 In doing so, they, along with other initiatives, 
 
1. See Greg Asbed & Steve Hitov, Preventing Forced Labor in Corporate Supply Chains: 
The Fair Food Program and Worker-Driven Social Responsibility, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
497, 502-03 (2017). 
2. Id. (quoting John Bowe, Nobodies: Does Slavery Exist in America?, NEW YORKER (Apr. 
21, 2003), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2003/04/21/nobodies 
[https://perma.cc/73MJ-RXMX]. 
3. See Mark Anner, Jennifer Bair & Jeremy Blasi, Toward Joint Liability in Global 
Supply Chains: Addressing the Root Causes of Labor Violations in International 
Subcontracting Networks, 35 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 1 (2013); Serajul Quadir & Ruma 
Paul, Rescuers comb Bangladesh rubble for second night, 260 dead, Reuters (Apr. 24, 2013, 
9:52 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/bangladesh-building/rescuers-comb-
bangladesh-rubble-for-second-night-260-dead-idINDEE93N05620130425 
[https://perma.cc/33B8-CJK4]. 
4. It was reported that there were at least 3,122 people inside Rana Plaza when it 
collapsed. See Quadir & Paul, supra note 3; Bangladesh factory collapse death toll tops 800, 
GUARDIAN (May 8, 2013, 2:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/08/bangladesh-factory-collapse-
death-toll [https://perma.cc/VSD6-H4CS]. 
5. See Jimmy Donaghey & Juliane Reinecke, When Industrial Democracy Meets 
Corporate Social Responsibility — A Comparison of the Bangladesh Accord and Alliance as 
Responses to the Rana Plaza Disaster, 56 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 14, 14 (2018). 
6. See Asbed & Hitov, supra note 1, at 506; Anner et al., supra note 3, at 2. 
7. See Asbed & Hitov, supra note 1, at n.30 (noting that agricultural workers are 
exempt from the US labor law); Donaghey & Reinecke, supra note 5, at 21-22 (noting pre-
Rana Plaza, Bangladesh suffered “an immature system of industrial relations and political 
corruption point to the limitations of traditional labour governance in the sector”). 
8. See generally ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH (May 13, 2013), 
https://admin.bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/2013-Accord.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4WGZ-UWRT]; Fair Food Code of Conduct, FAIR FOOD STANDARDS 
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have given all workers a new tool to force the beneficiaries of 
corporate supply chains to uphold labor rights from a living wage 
to workplace safety protections. The Coalition of Immokalee 
Workers (“CIW”)—an organized group of farmers from Florida—
created the Fair Food Program (“FFP”).9 Bangladeshi garment 
workers, along with various local and international workers 
organizations and over 220 Bangladeshi companies, signed the 
2013 Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh 
(“Accord”).10 The type of agreement that resulted from these 
workers’ efforts were Worker Driven Social Responsibility 
(“WSR”) Agreements. Unlike other forms of private regulation,11 
WSR Agreements center the needs of the workers they protect, are 
enforceable against the brands on top of complex global supply 
chains,12 and have achieved concrete successes.13 
This Note argues that WSR Agreements are the best form of 
private regulation for protecting workers’ rights in a corporate 
supply chain because they have protected these rights where other 
forms of private regulation—as well as local labor laws—have 
failed. To do so, this Note will outline both theoretical and practical 
aspects of WSR Agreements and evaluate these Agreements’ 
successes and failures. Part II explores both the theoretical and 
generalizable aspects of WSR Agreements and demonstrates their 
advantages over traditional forms of private regulation. Part III 
analyzes the successes achieved by two specific WSR Agreements: 
the FFP and the Bangladesh Accord. Part IV explores areas where 
these two WSR Agreements did not achieve their goals, and 
highlights outstanding questions facing future WSR Agreements. 
Lastly, Part V concludes by synthesizing the theoretical and 
practical aspects of WSR Agreements, demonstrating that their 
strengths far outweigh those of other forms of private regulation, 
and advocating for their use moving forward. 
 
COUNCIL, http://www.fairfoodstandards.org/resources/fair-food-code-of-conduct/ 
[https://perma.cc/5PKJ-5N5L] (last visited Oct. 10, 2020). 
9. See Fair Food Code of Conduct, supra note 8. 
10. See ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, supra note 8; see also 
About, ACCORD ON FIRE & BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGL.,  https://bangladeshaccord.org/about 
[https://perma.cc/RY98-8UB9] (last visited Oct. 10, 2020). 
11. See infra Part II.C. 
12. See infra Part II.D. 
13. See infra Part III. 
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II. WHAT IS A WORKER DRIVEN SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
AGREEMENT? 
A. The Problem: Large Corporations with Complex Supply Chains 
Regularly Exploit Their Workforce 
“In the early 1970s, the sky fell in,” is how one scholar 
described the collapse of the post-World War II economic order 
and the rise of new globalized neoliberal order.14 While the 
concept of globalization has long concerned workers’ advocates,15 
the explosion of industry in non-Western economies changed the 
gravitational center of the world economy.16 Businesses changed 
models: small local companies were replaced by giant brands that 
sit on top of complex, global, contracted supply chains.17 
Unfortunately, this model can severely impede a national labor 
movement because the brands at the top could shift their 
production from one subcontracted employer to another, even 
across national borders, in a “race to the bottom” of worker 
power.18 
Despite the hostile terrain, the labor movement did not 
surrender to the supply chain model of business organization. 
Since the 1990s, the United Nations (“UN”), the International Labor 
Organization (“ILO”), and labor activists have fought to institute a 
variety of private regulations to impose baseline standards on 
these long, international supply chains.19 Other forms of private 
regulation, such as Corporate Social Responsibility codes (“CSR”) 
and Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives (“MSI”) have failed to protect 
workers’ rights,20 while others, namely WSR Agreements, have 
enjoyed success in ameliorating the working conditions of 
 
14. PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL SHIFT: MAPPING THE CHANGING CONTOURS OF THE WORLD 
ECONOMY 16 (7th ed. 2015). 
15. See id. at 4; see also KARL MARX & FRIEDERICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 16 
(Samuel Moore trans., Rand Sch. of Soc. Sci. 1919) (1848) (“The need of a constantly 
expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the 
globe.”). 
16. See DICKEN, supra note 14, at 36. 
17. See Brecher, Costello & Smith, International Labor Solidarity: The New Frontier, 
15 NEW LAB. F. 8, 9 (2006). 
18. See id. at 10. 
19. See RUTH PEARSON ET AL., CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND LABOUR RIGHTS: CODES OF 
CONDUCT IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2002). 
20. See infra Part II.C. 
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previously unprotected workers in corporate supply chains.21 Part 
II.B will describe the theoretical aspects of WSR Agreements by 
explaining the shortcomings of other forms of private regulation 
and by providing the ways that WSR Agreements are a practical 
method of protecting workers’ rights in a supply chain. 
B. Worker Driven Social Responsibility Agreements Represent an 
Enforceable Form of Private Regulation 
Both the Fair Food Program and the Accord on Fire and 
Building Safety in Bangladesh are examples of WSR Agreements.22 
WSR Agreements regulate employment relationships through 
legally binding private contracts between workers (or worker 
organizations) and corporate brands.23 These agreements hold the 
corporate brands legally responsible for meeting minimum labor 
standards as defined in these agreements.24 Furthermore, these 
brands face legal and economic consequences for failing to meet 
these standards or for working with firms in the supply chain that 
fail to meet these standards.25 Importantly, the workers 
themselves, rather than corporations or third parties, design, 
monitor, and enforce these agreements.26 
The Worker-Driven Social Responsibility Network (“the 
Network”), a leading and authoritative online community of 
academics and advocates of WSR Agreements, has published six 
 
21. See infra Part III. 
22. See Success Stories, WORKER-DRIVEN SOC. RESP. NETWORK, https://wsr-
network.org/success-stories/ [https://perma.cc/C89Z-RYH5] (last visited Oct. 10, 2020); 
see also Greg Asbed, Worker-Driven Social Responsibility (WSR): A New Idea for a New 
Century, HUFFINGTON POST (June 17, 2014, 3:25 
PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/workerdriven-social-respo_b_5500104 
[https://perma.cc/4SP5-PXR2] (noting that the FFP and the Bangladesh Accord are WSR 
Agreements). 
23. See What is WSR, WORKER-DRIVEN SOC. RESP. NETWORK, https://wsr-
network.org/what-is-wsr/ [https://perma.cc/WD2Y-YJ9K] (last visited Oct. 10, 2020); see 
also Asbed, supra note 22 (noting WSR Agreements bind corporate supply chains). 
24. See What is WSR, supra note 23. 
25. See id. 
26. See id.; see generally Comparison of Critical Elements of WSR vs. CSR and MSIs, 
WORKER-DRIVEN SOC. RESP. NETWORK, https://wsr-network.org/type/tools-for-
practitioners/ [https://perma.cc/52NR-7XGL] (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (noting that 
multi-stakeholder initiatives share many commonalities with corporate social 
responsibility programs). 
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guiding principles that WSR Agreements should follow.27 These 
principles are: (1) labor rights initiatives must be worker-driven; 
(2) obligations for global corporations must be binding and 
enforceable; (3) buyers must afford suppliers the financial 
incentive and capacity to comply; (4) consequences for non-
compliant suppliers must be mandatory; (5) gains for workers 
must be measurable and timely; and (6) verification of workplace 
compliance must be rigorous and independent.28 These principles 
differentiate WSR Agreements from traditional forms of private 
regulation, such as CSRs and MSIs.29 
These principles outline an agreement that is stronger and, in 
practice, more effective than CSRs and MSIs. The first principle—
labor rights initiatives must be worker-driven—states that for an 
agreement to meet the standards articulated by the Network, 
workers must be present at every stage of its development, from 
proposal to enforcement.30 The Network suggests that any WSR 
Agreement, at the minimum, should comply with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) and the Conventions of the 
ILO.31 Importantly, this principle explicitly incorporates the core 
ILO conventions, which theoretically already impose a duty on 
most nations to enforce some worker protections.32 The second 
principle—obligations for global corporations must be binding and 
enforceable—forecloses the possibility that, once signed, 
corporate compliance with the WSR Agreement is optional or 
voluntary.33 The third principle—buyers must afford suppliers the 
 
27. See Statement of Principles for Worker-driven Social Responsibility (WSR), 
WORKER-DRIVEN SOC. RESP. NETWORK, https://wsr-network.org/about-us/endorsers/ 
[https://perma.cc/JND9-XY8U] (last visited Oct. 10, 2020). 
28. Id. 
29. See generally Comparison of Critical Elements of WSR vs. CSR and MSIs, supra note 
26 (noting that multi-stakeholder initiatives share many commonalities with corporate 
social responsibility programs). 
30. See Statement of Principles for Worker-driven Social Responsibility (WSR), supra 
note 27. 
31. See id. (saying that a WSR Agreement “must be based on universal labor and 
human rights principles, which are embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and defined by the Conventions of the ILO”). 
32. See id.; see also Fair Food Code of Conduct, supra note 8 (incorporating several of 
the ILO core conventions in practice); ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, 
supra note 8, at 1 (explicitly incorporating the ILO Conventions on Freedom of 
Association). 
33. See Statement of Principles for Worker-driven Social Responsibility (WSR), supra 
note 27. 
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financial incentive and capacity to comply—reflects one of the 
important innovations of WSR Agreements,34 that organized 
groups of workers and advocates need to place pressure at the top 
of the supply chain to counter the market forces that often 
incentivize worker abuse.35 The fourth principle—consequences 
for non-compliant suppliers must be mandatory—coupled with 
the second, helps rectify a large weakness of CSRs and MSIs, 
namely a lack of enforcement, by ensuring that violators cannot 
escape negative consequences through enforceable contractual 
terms that impose liability on any violations.36 The fifth principle—
gains for workers must be measurable and timely—ensures the 
effectiveness of the WSR Agreement by mandating that the positive 
outcomes of the agreement be measurable and timely.37 Lastly, the 
sixth principle—verification of workplace compliance must be 
rigorous and independent—is also a marked departure from CSR 
programs as it divorces oversight of the program from the parties 
that are bound by it. Thus, the brands at the top of the supply chain 
cannot manipulate the oversight process.38 Further, this principle 
calls for a financially independent oversight process that includes 
expert inspectors, worker interviews free from intimidation, an 
independent complaint mechanism, and extensive worker 
education programs that inform workers of their rights under the 
WSR Agreement.39 
C. Other Forms of Private Regulation Lack the Strength of WSR 
Agreements 
These principles help differentiate WSR Agreements from 
traditional forms of private regulation, namely CSRs and MSIs. To 
illustrate this difference, it is important to briefly describe CSRs 
and MSIs. CSRs are codes of conduct generally adopted by large, 
transnational corporations to show that they intend to protect 
 
34. Asbed & Hitov, supra note 1, at 506 (noting that the CIW “realized” that the 
corporate suites of major food retailers were responsible for the abuse and poverty). 
35. See Statement of Principles for Worker-driven Social Responsibility (WSR), supra 
note 27. 
36. See id. 
37. See id. 
38. See id. 
39. See id. 
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“decent” labor standards.40 The strongest proponents of CSRs 
point to a variety of advantages. CSRs regulate international 
markets that may be beyond traditional legal jurisdictions.41 They 
can adapt quickly to changing economic, technological, or scientific 
standards.42 They also represent a corporation’s public 
commitment to certain standards, which can attract customers 
who are concerned about corporate ethics.43 In conjunction with 
specific CSRs, corporate behavior may be influenced by the UN’s 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (“Guiding 
Principles”), which, while not directly binding on any corporation 
or non-state entity, compel states to protect against human rights 
abuses by private entities within their jurisdiction and set 
guidelines on how these entities should respect human rights.44 
Under these Guiding Principles, corporations have the 
responsibility “to respect human rights and [provide] access to an 
effective remedy” to any violations.45 The duty to respect human 
rights is often articulated as a duty to conduct due diligence in 
avoiding human rights abuses.46 Under this articulation, a 
corporation that fails to conduct due diligence—such as by failing 
to develop good faith compliance programs or to implement 
internal systems to avoid violations—may suffer civil or criminal 
sanctions, but only under the color of its domestic jurisdiction.47 
Like CSRs, MSIs operate through codes of conduct. Unlike the 
CSRs, however, these codes of conduct are developed with some 
 
40. JAMES J. BRUDNEY, Decent Labour Standards in Corporate Supply Chains: The 
Immokalee Workers Model, in TEMPORARY LABOUR MIGRATION IN THE GLOBAL ERA: THE 
REGULATORY CHALLENGES 351, 356 (Joanna Howe & Rosemary Owens eds., 2016). 
41. See Martijn Scheltema, An Assessment of the Effectiveness of International Private 
Regulation in the Corporate Social Responsibility Arena: A Legal Perspective, 21 MAASTRICHT 
J. EUR. & COMP. L. 383, 385 (2014). 
42. See id. 
43. See BRUDNEY, supra note 40, at 356-57. 
44. See Peter Muchlinski, Implementing the New UN Corporate Human Rights 
Framework: Implications for Corporate Law, Governance, and Regulation, 22 BUS. ETHICS Q. 
145, 147 (2012); see generally John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary 
General), Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 
2011) (setting out the new guidelines on human rights and businesses with weak 
language). The Guiding Principles were endorsed by the Human Rights Council and 
purport to guide all states and business organizations. See id. at 6. 
45. Muchlinski, supra note 44, at 145. 
46. See id. at 157. 
47. See id. at 157-58. 
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third-party, usually an NGO or activist group.48 MSIs evolved in the 
vacuum created by the doctrine of deregulation that permeated the 
global economy beginning in the 1980s.49 Early in that decade, 
some proponents of the CSR model recognized that any private 
regulation needed to include more actors than merely the 
corporation and state actors to achieve some form of acceptance 
among workers.50 This expansion prompted proponents of private 
regulation to include NGOs, citizen movements and other non-
state, non-corporate actors in these corporate policies.51 Thus, 
MSIs could move beyond the “ad hoc and piecemeal” nature of 
traditional CSR programs, which rely on no outside insight or 
input, and create cohesive programs that, at least on paper, create 
regulatory regimes that promoted social goods, retained 
credibility, and remained voluntary.52 
However, critics of CSRs and MSIs charge that these efforts are 
ineffectual at best and mere window dressings at worst.53 
Critically, the fundamental difference between WSR Agreements 
and other forms of private regulation is the actor who is ultimately 
responsible for guarding against and sanctioning labor rights 
violations. Under the traditional CSR formulation (i.e. a code of 
conduct adopted by a specific brand, company, or supply chain), 
the corporation’s central duty is its fiduciary duties to its 
shareholders, and thus the protection of human rights is at most a 
secondary objective.54 
The classic example of a largely unsuccessful CSR program is 
Nike’s Code of Conduct.55 In 1992, a series of investigative reports 
from journalists and activists thrust Nike’s below-subsistence 
 
48. See Donaghey & Reinecke, supra note 5, at 19. 
49. See Peter Utting, Regulating Business via Multistakeholder Initiatives: A 
Preliminary Assessment, in VOLUNTARY APPROACHES TO CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: READINGS 
AND A RESOURCE GUIDE 1, 5 (2002). 
50. See id. at 6. 
51. See id. 
52. See id. at 6-8. 
53. See Comparison of Critical Elements of WSR vs. CSR and MSIs, supra note 26, at 3; 
see generally Ruggie, supra note 44 (setting out the new guidelines on human rights and 
businesses with weak language); BRUDNEY, supra note 40. 
54. Muchlinski, supra note 44, at 159. 
55. For a full accounting of Nike as a case study, see DEBORA SPAR & JENNIFER BURNS, 
HITTING THE WALL: NIKE AND INTERNATIONAL LABOR PRACTICES (2002). 
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wages—and other appalling labor practices—into the spotlight.56 
To remedy the issue, Nike adopted a “Code of Conduct and 
Memorandum of Understanding” that purported to force Nike’s 
contracted suppliers to adhere to baseline working conditions.57 
However, even after years of aggressive public relations campaigns 
and the apparent implementation of the Code of Conduct, Nike did 
not raise the below-subsistence wages that were the source of the 
original controversy.58 In 2019, a report authored by the Clean 
Clothes Campaign, an global alliance of garment worker advocates, 
concluded that there was no evidence that Nike was paying its 
workers a living wage, despite the promises of its Code of 
Conduct.59 
MSIs appear to be more efficacious because of participating 
NGOs that are advocating for workers’ rights, but by excluding the 
workers the MSI purports to protect, critics say they are “trying to 
have their cake and eat it too.”60 Recent critiques of MSIs 
demonstrate their weakness. One is the gap between paper and 
practice.61 Often, workers cannot understand the language in 
which the codes of conduct governing MSI agreements are 
written.62 Consequently, workers often are unaware of how to 
assert the protections offered by the MSI.63 Even if a worker knew 
the details of their governing MSI it is unlikely to be of much help. 
A recent study analyzing whether MSIs have delivered on their 
promises found that MSIs “are not effective tools for holding 
corporations accountable for abuses, protecting rights holders 
against human rights violations, or providing survivors and victims 
with access to remedy.”64 A survey of the top “standard setting” 
 
56. See id. at 4; see also Jeffrey Ballinger, The New Free-Trade Heel, HARPER’S MAG., 
Aug. 1992, at 4647 (noting that Nike’s Indonesian workers made just under fourteen cents 
an hour). 
57. SPAR & BURNS, supra note 55 at 5. 
58. See id. at 13 (“But on wages, they’re still lying through their teeth.”). 
59. See CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN, TAILORED WAGES 52 (2019). 
60. Donaghey & Reinecke, supra note 5, at 19 (quoting Luc Fransen, Multi-stakeholder 
governance and voluntary programme interactions: legitimation politics in the institutional 
design of corporate social responsibility, 10 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 163 (2012)). 
61. See Utting, supra note 49, at 7. 
62. See id. 
63. See id. 
64. See MSINTEGRITY, NOT FIT-FOR-PURPOSE: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT OF MULTI-
STAKEHOLDER INITIATIVES IN CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 4 (2020) (a 200+ page reporting detailing multiple failures of MSIs). 
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MSIs revealed that they generally “do not have a grievance 
mechanism, nor do they require that their individual members 
provide an effective grievance mechanism.”65 For the few that do 
have such grievance mechanisms, they “fail to meet the minimum 
internationally recognized criteria for access to effective 
remedy.”66 These faults exist because the non-traditional actors 
incorporated into the MSIs tend to be those that do not have 
agendas that pose a real threat to corporate status quo.67 NGOs or 
other groups—notably trade unions—that could design a MSI that 
would alter the corporate driven “production and consumption 
patterns,” which drive poor labor conditions, are generally not 
included in the design process.68 As a result, the MSIs that are 
implemented tend to “fail to respect the centrality of rights 
holders” that they purport to protect.69 
 Unfortunately, MSIs largely have failed to deliver the results 
they promised. The summary report70 “Not Fit-for-Purpose the 
Grand Experiment of Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives in Corporate 
Accountability, Human Rights and Global Governance,”71 details six 
insights into MSIs that suggest they do not actually protect 
workers. The Summary Report finds that MSIs have waning 
influence and entrench corporate power.72 Further, they tend to 
adopt “weak or narrow standards” that are then inadequately 
monitored, creating a “misperception that abuses are being 
effectively addressed” or ignoring the root causes of the abuse.73 
Lastly, the report concludes that the structure of MSIs do not 
provide the people it purports to protect access to a remedy when 
abuse is found and thus says “[t]here is little evidence that MSIs are 
 
65. See id. at 161. 
66. See id. at 166. 
67. See Utting, supra note 49, at 8. 
68. See id. 
69. See MSINTEGRITY, supra note 64, at 179. For an in-depth, personal account of an 
MSI evaluated by MSIntegrity, see Maria Hengeveld, The Factory Oversight Industry 
Protects Profits, Not People, NATION, (Apr. 23, 2020), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/world/factory-audit-investigation/ 
[https://perma.cc/6YTK-8EJ6] (detailing how Social Accountability International, an MSI, 
cheats on its own reports). 
70. MSINTEGRITY, SUMMARY REPORT: NOT FIT-FOR-PURPOSE: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT OF 
MULTI-STAKEHOLDER INITIATIVES IN CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 4 (2020) [hereinafter MSINTEGRITY SUMMARY REPORT]. 
71. See MSINTEGRITY, supra note 64. 
72. See MSINTEGRITY SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 70, at 9. 
73. See id. 
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meaningfully protecting rights holders or closing governance 
gaps.”74 It is important to highlight that the author of this report is 
the Institute for Multi-Stakeholder Initiative Integrity, an 
organization (previously) dedicated to promoting MSIs.75 
The Guiding Principles are vulnerable to similar criticisms. 
Unlike WSR Agreements, or even MSIs, the Guiding Principles 
make state actors solely responsible for the protection of human 
rights.76 While this may not seem like a fatal defect, critics charge 
that not only are workers not a party to the Guiding Principles, the 
language is very weak (e.g. it “encourage[s]” protection of human 
rights “where appropriate”).77 Thus, critics charge that the due 
diligence standard articulated by the Guiding Principles will be 
voluntary at best because the limited liability protections enjoyed 
by multinational corporations will insulate them from the legal 
consequences of noncompliance.78 Supporters argue that the 
Guiding Principles have created a marketplace of compliance.79 
Unfortunately, the individual “actors” in this new marketplace are 
CSR or MSI programs.80 However, this “marketplace” is susceptible 
to key market failures. Because the market actors—under this 
conception—would be CSRs and MSIs, the market could never 
provide solutions to problems that these types of programs 
typically cannot solve, such as labor issues. In response, some 
commenters propose additional state or international action in the 
form of the Human Rights Reporting and Assurance Frameworks 
Initiative (“RAFI”). The RAFI is a program that essentially tries to 
standardize these forms of private regulation by offering accepted 
frameworks for reporting and oversight that could be used across 
various CSRS and MSIs.81 Unfortunately, the RAFI is susceptible to 
similar critiques as the MSIs.82 It relies on a top-down institution 
 
74. See id. 
75. See id. In light of these findings, it appears that MSIntegrity no longer champions 
the MSI model. 
76. See Ruggie, supra note 44, at 4, 6. 
77. Id. 
78. See Nicola Jagers, Column: UN Guiding Principles: Making Headway Toward Real 
Corporate Accountability?, 29 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 159, 162 (2011). 
79. See Larry Cata Backer, Moving Forward the UN Guiding Principles for Business and 
Human Rights: Between Enterprise Social Norm, State Domestic Legal Orders, and the Treaty 
Law that Might Bind Them All, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 457, 495 (2015). 
80. See id. at 496. 
81. For an extended discussion of the RAFI, see id. at 497-512. 
82. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.  
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that sets rules and standards without worker input. Thus, even 
with the RAFI, the Guiding Principles do not follow the Network’s 
Six Principles of WSR. 
D. WSR Agreements Offer an Adaptable Model to Worker 
Organizers 
To demonstrate that WSR Agreements are possible, effective, 
and different than other forms of private regulation, the WSR 
Network published several concept briefs that help ground the six 
guiding principles discussed above into concrete agreements.83 
While the Network strongly advocates for WSR Agreements, it 
recognizes that WSR Agreements are not widely used.84 The 
Network highlights eight “feasibility assessment” areas that 
workers should evaluate when determining if implementing a WSR 
Agreement is feasible.85 
The first “feasibility assessment” area is the scope of the labor 
violations. WSR Agreements are, at their core, contractual 
agreements to address labor violations.86 Workers have a stronger 
position at the bargaining table when there is independent or 
third-party documentation of abuses because this legitimizes their 
grievances.87 Furthermore, WSR Agreements should be as broad as 
possible,88 addressing labor abuses at the sectoral, regional or 
supply-chain level, rather than focusing on one factory or 
subcontractor.89 This is because a WSR Agreement necessarily 
increases the cost of production.90 Therefore, a WSR Agreement 
that does not bind enough suppliers and buyers can result in 
capital flight.91 Labor rights cannot be protected if workplaces are 
 
83. See Search Results concept briefs, WORKER-DRIVEN SOC. RESP. NETWORK, 
https://wsr-network.org/?s=concept+brief [https://perma.cc/WK7E-76JL] (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2020) (listing all available concept briefs). 
84. See WSR NETWORK, WSR Concept Brief: Feasibility Assessment, WORKER-DRIVEN 
SOC. RESP. NETWORK 1 (May 15, 2018), https://wsr-network.org/resource/feasibility-
assessment/ [https://perma.cc/X7NM-BYB4]. 
85. See id. 
86. See generally What is WSR, supra note 23 (detailing the basic principles of WSR 
agreements). 
87. See WSR Concept Brief: Feasibility Assessment, supra note 84, at 1-2. 
88. See id. at 2. 
89. See id. 
90. See id. 
91. See id. 
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closed the moment workers make any gains.92 Still, a sufficiently 
wide-reaching WSR Agreement can prevent capital flight because 
there will be nowhere for capital to flee.93 
Secondly, workers must understand the political systems and 
economic markets in which the brands at the top of the supply 
chain exist.94 The WSR Agreement must be tailored to ensure that 
sanctions imposed on violators can be enforced effectively and 
cause concrete economic consequences to the brands.95 The next 
three “feasibility assessment” areas remind workers that it is 
necessary to make sure that a WSR Agreement fits in with any 
existing labor organization or previous organizing strategy.96 To 
that end, organizers should define the scope of the membership 
proposed organization and develop a “strategic plan” to capitalize 
on any previous organizing campaign.97 While logistically 
important, these considerations are not unique to WSR 
Agreements, all campaigns must account for these factors. 
The final three “feasibility assessment” areas highlight 
important background necessities over implementing and 
maintaining a WSR Agreement.98 One area concerns the funding of 
the regime created by the WSR Agreement, which warrants its own 
discussion, and the other two remind advocates to consider the 
prevailing laws governing freedom of association and access to 
legal support.99 Simply put, the laws governing freedom of 
association are generally weak in areas where a WSR Agreement is 
needed100 and the legal support needed to enforce them can 
require a consistent source of funding. Advocates for a WSR 
Agreement must keep these factors in mind. 
WSR Agreements have high start-up costs and continuous 
implementation and monitoring costs.101 The Network highlights 
several potential funding sources including independent grants, 
 
92. See id. 
93. See id. 
94. See id. at 3. 
95. See id. 
96. See id. at 3-5. 
97. See id. Generally, a wider WSR Agreement is preferable. See id. at 2 and 
accompanying text. 
98. See WSR Concept Brief: Feasibility Assessment, supra note 84, at 5-6. 
99. See id. 
100. See Donaghey & Reinecke, supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
101. See id. at 5. 
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governmental support, mass membership dues and, most 
commonly, a self-financing mechanism.102 Both the Fair Food 
Program and the Bangladesh Accord rely on some form of self-
financing.103 Under the Bangladesh Accord, manufacturers pay a 
scaling fee that covers enforcement costs.104 Similarly, buyers 
bound by the Fair Food Program pay a premium (called the “penny 
per pound” premium) on goods produced by covered 
employees.105 This premium is directly transferred to the 
paychecks of covered workers.106 In both instances, the money 
collected furthers a key goal of each WSR Agreement: either 
workplace safety or wage increases.107 However, the Network 
warns that completely relying on money derived from buyers is 
risky.108 Such reliance can lead to undue bias or hesitation when 
determining violations, as the stream of funds could be 
threatened.109 
Clearly, grant money110 or large-scale donations cannot be the 
only, or even the main, source of funds because neither are 
guaranteed on a yearly basis. Worker membership dues can work 
in situations where the WSR Agreement functions like a collective 
bargaining agent. In theory, an agreement could expand a “penny 
per pound” type program so that workers then transfer some of the 
wage increase into the management of the WSR Agreement. 
 
102. See id. 
103. See Annual Fees for June 2019 - 2020, ACCORD ON FIRE & BUILDING SAFETY BANGL. 1 
(2019), https://bangladesh.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Annual-fees-
table-October-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/KA3Z-5K2T]; Fair Food Program: Frequently 
Asked Questions, COALITION OF IMMOKALEE WORKERS, http://ciw-online.org/ffp_faq/ 
[https://perma.cc/2DWG-DA8V] (last visited Oct. 21, 2020). 
104. See Annual Fees for June 2019 - 2020, supra note 103, at 1. 
105. See Fair Food Program: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 103. 
106. See id. 
107. See ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, supra note 8; Fair Food 
Program: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 103. 
108. See WSR Concept Brief: Feasibility Assessment, supra note 84, at 5. 
109. See id. at 5. 
110. For example, one of the co-founders of the CIW, Greg Asbed, received a John D. 
and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Fellowship in 2017 and donated the entire 
$625,000 grant to the CIW. See Noam Scheiber, A MacArthur ʻGeniusʼ on Overcoming 
Modern Farm Slavery, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/business/economy/macarthur-genius-greg-
asbed-ciw.html [https://perma.cc/6WB9-AMGM]; see also From Immokalee Organizer to 
MacArthur Fellow: Meet Greg Asbed, CORNELL UNIV. PRESS, 
https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/from-immokalee-paralegal-to-macarthur-fellow-
meet-greg-asbed/ [https://perma.cc/SB7N-D3BY] (last visited Oct. 22, 2020). 
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However, this may not be feasible in situations where the WSR 
Agreement is attempting to root out actual or practical slave labor 
because there may not be enough money going to the worker to 
cover the cost of the WSR Agreements. 
The WSR Network merely mentions mass membership 
dues—an idea that can and should be expanded.111 While there are 
many organizations that have relied on membership dues and 
small-dollar donations, one analogous organization is the 
American Black Panther Party (“Panthers”), active during the 
1960s and 1970s.112 Like workers implementing a WSR 
Agreement, the Panthers were cut off from normal avenues of 
capital and, instead, relied on private, individualized donations.113 
To raise money, the Panthers sold an official newspaper and 
merchandise, went on paid speaking tours, and collected private 
donations from individuals. 114 While some individuals donated a 
small amount,115 other wealthier supporters could secretly give 
much more than the average supporter. 116 A workers group 
operating under a WSR Agreement could use similar means to 
capitalize on both local and global support. While not a lucrative 
source of fundraising117 these sources can provide stable and 
independent funding that can supplement a self-financing 
provision. Thus, while funding presents an obstacle to WSR 
Agreement feasibility, a combination of traditional and innovative 
funding sources can help overcome this concern. 
Two of the briefs promulgated by the WSR Network concern 
intertwined issues: WSR Agreement’s code of conduct,118 and 
 
111. See WSR Concept Brief: Feasibility Assessment, supra note 84, at 5. 
112. See Ryan J. Kirkby, “The Revolution Will Not Be Televised”: Community Activism 
and the Black Panther Party, 1966-1971, 41 CANADIAN REV. AM. STUD. 25, 26 (2011). 
113. See id. at 41 (“Not surprisingly, because of the Black Panther Party’s 
revolutionary program, most chapters were unable to rely on donations from mainstream 
humanitarian groups to support their social activities.”). 
114. See id. 
115. See id. 
116. See id. at n.16. 
117. See id. at 41 (“the life of most Panthers was marked by neither opulence nor 
excess”). 
118. See WSR NETWORK, WSR Concept Brief: Worker-Defined Codes and Standards, 
WORKER-DRIVEN SOC. RESP. NETWORK, 1 (2018), https://wsr-network.org/resource/codes-
and-standards/ [https://perma.cc/94NQ-RJ3G]. 
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compliance monitoring.119 The Network states that any given WSR 
Agreement has three stages of life: definition, implementation, and 
iteration.120 As a result, the monitoring process changes as the WSR 
Agreement is implemented. The Network divides the monitoring 
process into different categories: the development of a monitoring 
organization, the creation of a reporting process, and an analysis of 
actions taken to ensure compliance.121 These categories connect to 
one another. As drafters define the WSR Agreement, they should 
also develop a compliance organization; for the WSR Agreement to 
be implemented, there necessarily must be a reporting mechanism. 
And finally, as the WSR Agreement matures into a stable status 
quo, workers need to be able to evaluate its effectiveness. Because 
WSR Agreements are generally implemented in places where local 
law or practice does not sufficiently protect labor rights,122 
incorporating binding language into WSR Agreements can be a 
challenge. Therefore, the Network urges drafters of WSR 
Agreements to ground their principles in the UDHR and the Core 
Conventions of the ILO.123 
This grounding has important implications. First, it grounds 
the WSR Agreement within a body of legal decisions, scholarship, 
and advocacy. Second, it can help reduce the logistical and financial 
burden of creating an independent monitoring organization, which 
the Network argues is a “tremendous asset” that has “extensive 
expertise” beyond that of an existing organization that “generally 
lack[s] meaningful experience detecting and documenting 
violations” of a WSR Agreement.124 These new, independent, 
monitoring organizations will have extensive expertise on the 
issues within the WSR Agreement it was created to monitor, but 
may lack the institutional knowledge of previously existing 
organizations. Thus, by incorporating the UDHR and the Core 
Conventions of the ILO, these new organizations can look to other 
 
119. See WSR NETWORK, WSR Concept Brief: Monitoring, WORKER-DRIVEN SOC. RESP. 
NETWORK, 1 (2018), https://wsr-network.org/resource/monitoring/ 
[https://perma.cc/H2LV-2YC2]. 
120. See WSR Concept Brief: Worker-Defined Codes and Standards, supra note 118. 
121. WSR Concept Brief: Monitoring, supra note 119, at 2. 
122. See Anner et al., supra note 3, at 2; Asbed & Hitov, supra note 1, at 510; Donaghey 
& Reinecke, supra note 5, at 14. 
123. See WSR Concept Brief: Worker-Defined Codes and Standards, supra note 118, at 
2. 
124. WSR Concept Brief: Monitoring, supra note 119, at 2. 
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initiatives and programs that adhere to these well-established 
methods for guidance and strategies. They can then combine these 
methods with their inherent expertise on key issues. 
An implemented WSR Agreement must contain market or 
financial penalties, 125 because it needs to ensure that the brands at 
the top of the supply chain suffer consequences for 
noncompliance.126 Accordingly, the WSR Agreement must enable 
workers to quickly and effectively report any violations of the Code 
of Conduct to the monitoring organization.127 These complaint 
procedures should resemble whistleblower procedures, but be 
independent of the brands.128 Traditional whistleblower channels 
are often outsourced to other companies, but this outsourcing is 
less than ideal because it adds another layer of bureaucracy to the 
process, which can delay both reporting and the remedy.129 
Instead, workers should see the fruits of their complaints, such as 
public responses from management or non-retaliatory meetings 
that work at achieving a quick and painless resolution of the 
underlying complaint.130 
Furthermore, enforcement cannot only come from 
complaints. Ideally, a WSR Agreement will have independent 
inspecting provisions consistent with ILO Convention 81.131 By 
having proactive enforcement, suppliers and brands will face 
affirmative pressure to comply with the agreement. This helps 
lower the pressure on workers who may feel reluctant to report 
violations by their supervisor or other authority figure. Strong 
language, an effective reporting system, and an independent 
inspectorate help in two ways. First, these structures help ensure 
workers—especially those not involved in its creation—feel that 
the WSR Agreement has power.132 Second, a strong formal 
structure that is used and powerful will eventually force suppliers 
 
125. See WSR Concept Brief: Worker-Defined Codes and Standards, supra note 118, at 
2. 
126. See Statement of Principles for Worker-driven Social Responsibility (WSR), supra 
note 27. 
127. See WSR Concept Brief: Monitoring, supra note 119, at 3. 
128. See id. 
129. See id. 
130. See id. at 3-4. 
131. See id. at 4. For the convention, see ILO Convention (No. 81) Concerning Labour 
Inspection in Industry and Commerce, July 11, 1946, 54 U.N.T.S. 3. 
132. See WSR Concept Brief: Monitoring, supra note 119, at 3. 
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and brands to accept its existence to maintain sales.133 Thus, a 
strong, independent, transparent, and effective complaint system 
is necessary to the success of implementing and enforcing a Code 
of Conduct that ameliorates labor conditions. 
Lastly, drafters of WSR Agreements need to include 
provisions that let those governed by the WSR Agreement evaluate 
the program. As the WSR Agreement is enforced, new and 
unforeseen issues will likely arise.134 Ideally, the relationship 
between employer and worker will become less fractious, to the 
point where modifications to the Code that reflect changes in the 
industry can positively impact both parties.135 Thus, the structure 
described above should be publicly available to allow for NGOs, 
governments, and other worker initiatives to assess the successes 
and failures of any particular WSR Agreement. Outside assessment 
has numerous benefits. It proves to the workers that the WSR 
Agreement is effectively protecting their rights.136 It creates a 
database of violations, resolutions, and restitutions, which is 
valuable to both investigators and employers.137 Lastly, an open 
system can demonstrate to other employers that WSR Agreements 
are not business-ending ventures, but rather effective ways to 
preserve a safe and decent workplace,138 which could entice other 
employers to join. Employers proactively joining existing 
agreements or creating new WSR Agreements is better for all 
involved parties than waiting until a Rana Plaza-type disaster 
strikes. 
The concept briefs discussed above lay out the generic 
fundamental structures of a WSR Agreement. They sketch out a 
binding contractual agreement between workers and employers 
that can protect labor rights across an entire sector or supply 
chain. Through independent structures, WSR agreements can 
provide oversight untainted by the company they purport to bind. 
Through a combination of traditional and innovative mechanisms, 
they can maintain their independence. Further, they provide a 
 
133. See WSR Concept Brief: Worker-Defined Codes and Standards, supra note 118, at 
2. 
134. See id. 
135. See id. 
136. See WSR Concept Brief: Monitoring, supra note 119, at 5. 
137. See id. 
138. See WSR Concept Brief: Worker-Defined Codes and Standards, supra note 118, at 
2. 
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stable legal model that can protect a group of workers for extended 
periods of time. This contrasts them with traditional CSR and MSI 
models of private regulation, which often lack robust complaint 
processes, effective penalties, or independent monitoring systems. 
Regarding the protection of labor rights, WSR Agreements 
address criticisms levied against other forms of private regulation. 
The contractual nature of the WSR Agreement ensures that 
workers and the public writ large know which companies, brands, 
suppliers, and workers are bound by the WSR Agreement.139 It is 
simply too hard to keep a contract that is supported by potentially 
thousands of workers secret. Furthermore, a provision within the 
WSR Agreement will generally mandate a level of publicity.140 
This publicity stands in contrast with CSRs and MSIs, where 
the transparency of the policy is beyond the power of the 
workers.141 The obscured nature of other forms of private 
regulations can enable bad-faith employers to shift standards and 
modify what constitutes “compliant” behavior. Furthermore, 
because WSR Agreements are developed by the workers, the 
conditions they impose on employers reflect the needs of the 
workers.142 In contrast, other forms of private regulation, even 
MSIs developed with outside groups, may impose a generic or 
irrelevant standard on employers and fail to address the needs of 
the workers.143 In addition, the independent nature of WSR 
Agreement oversight ensures that the complaint process remains 
free from employer bias.144 This contrasts with other forms of 
private regulation which can easily enable employers to retaliate 
against complainants.145 Even if an employer adopted a form of 
private regulation that was transparent, spoke to relevant issues, 
and had an independent complaint procedure, a WSR Agreement 
would still be stronger. 
 
139. See Comparison of Critical Elements of WSR vs. CSR and MSIs, supra note 26, at 3. 
140. See id. 
141. See id. 
142. See id. 
143. See Donaghey & Reinecke, supra note 5, at 19; see also Utting, supra note 49, at 
21 (noting “there is no guarantee that participation in [MSIs] that focus on management 
systems will significantly improve a firm’s social and environmental performance or 
impact.”). 
144. See Comparison of Critical Elements of WSR vs. CSR and MSIs, supra note 26, at 2; 
see also Utting, supra note 49, at 29 (noting that complaint-based MSIs tend to be fairly 
weak). 
145. See Success Stories, supra note 22. 
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The greatest benefit of a WSR Agreement over other forms of 
private regulation is its enforceability.146 Unlike the optional 
nature of other private regulations,147 the “defining element” of a 
WSR Agreement is that it is a legally binding contract that 
signatories cannot renounce without suffering negative economic 
consequences.148 Furthermore, even under stronger CSRs and 
MSIs, effective consequences are never guaranteed.149 If a brand 
engages in self-disciplinary behavior, there is no guarantee it will 
deter against future violations or be any more harsh than a slap on 
the wrist.150 Conversely, not only are the consequences of violating 
WSR Agreements public, they are designed by the workers so that 
they carry significant market consequences.151 Thus, in principle, 
WSR Agreements bind employers to effective and relevant 
standards, impose sanctions for non-compliance, and deter labor 
rights violations, unlike other forms of private regulation, which 
may consist of merely empty promises and do not compromise the 
corporate status quo. 
III. WSR AGREEMENT SUCCESS STORIES: THE FAIR FOOD 
PROGRAM AND THE ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN 
BANGLADESH 
The general principles described above derive from and 
inspire new WSR Agreements. Two of the most important WSR 
Agreements have already been mentioned.152 The Fair Food 
Program and the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh 
represent two successful, effective WSR Agreements. Fleshing out 
each of these WSR Agreements demonstrates how the universal 
principles are adapted across sectors and how drafters necessarily 
tailored each WSR Agreement to the adverse conditions they 
wished to ameliorate. 
 
146. See id. at 1. 
147. See BRUDNEY, supra note 40 at 356-57; Scheltema, supra note 41 at 385. 
148. See Comparison of Critical Elements of WSR vs. CSR and MSIs, supra note 26, at 1. 
149. See BRUDNEY, supra note 40, at 356-57; Scheltema, supra note 41, at 385. 
150. See Comparison of Critical Elements of WSR vs. CSR and MSIs, supra note 26, at 1. 
151. See id. 
152. See generally ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, supra note 8; 
Fair Food Code of Conduct, supra note 8. 
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A. The Fair Food Program 
As discussed in Part I, the Fair Food Program is a WSR 
Agreement developed by the Coalition of Immokalee Workers in 
response to horrendous working conditions and low to no 
wages.153 Until the establishments of CIW and FFP, agricultural 
employers brutalized their workers.154 The history of worker 
exploitation in the agricultural fields of Florida begins with chattel 
slavery, dating back to the eve of the Civil War, when up to forty-
four percent of people living in Florida were enslaved.155 Even 
worse, slavery in Florida was particularly brutal as slaveowners 
pushed the enslaved workers to produce faster and faster, which 
often required “new and harsher forms of abuse.”156 Even after the 
abolition of slavery, the fields of Florida were rife with abuse.157 An 
interlocking system of prison labor, debt peonage, and the targeted 
lynchings of labor organizers kept wages low and working 
conditions poor well into the twentieth century.158 
By the 1990s, the degradation occurring in the fields caused 
farmworkers to begin to band together.159 Starting in 1993, these 
workers would gather in local Catholic churches to discuss the 
abuse and to explore ways to fight back.160 These informal 
gatherings would transform into the CIW by the end of the 
1990s.161 Between 1993 and 2001, the nascent CIW organized 
locally and helped the Department of Justice prosecute seven farm 
labor servitude cases in Florida.162 However, these efforts did not 
address the main cause of the abuse: the supply chain of the brands 
 
153. See Asbed & Hitov, supra note 1, at 503. 
154. See id. at 499. 
155. See id. at 500. 
156. See id. 
157. See id. 
158. See id. at 500-02. 
159. See id. at 504. 
160. See id. (noting that they discussed “forced labor to subpoverty wages, 
widespread sexual harassment, verbal abuse, and violence at the hands of local farm 
bosses”). 
161. See About, COAL. IMMOKALEE WORKERS, https://ciw-online.org/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/P7CL-YKVW] (last visited Nov. 9, 2020); see also Coalition of Immokalee 
Workers, NAT’L FARM WORKER MINISTRY (June 2018), http://nfwm.org/farm-
workers/farmworker-partners/coalition-of-immokalee-
workers/#:~:text=History%20of%20CIW,tomato%20industry%20had%20been%20dec
lining [https://perma.cc/P7CL-YKVW]. 
162. See Asbed & Hitov, supra note 1, at 502. 
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that bought Floridian crops. The different brands on top of supply 
chains could circumvent these actions by easily switching between 
different farms;163 thus they could frustrate CIW’s efforts by not 
buying from farms where the CIW had a presence. This led the CIW 
to expand its organizing efforts so it could respond to the supply 
chain problem. 
Unfortunately, the CIW could not turn to traditional sources 
of organized relief, such as labor unions, because agricultural 
workers (including the tomato pickers that created the CIW) were 
generally exempt from protection by relevant American labor law 
and could not form traditional labor unions.164 It is important to 
the development of the FFP that the CIW existed beyond the reach 
of labor law. Despite lacking legal protection, the CIW initially tried 
traditional labor strategies to end the abuse.165 For about a decade 
before implementing the FFP, the CIW engaged in community 
strikes and work stoppages, which led to increased wages.166 
However, without institutional legitimacy, direct action quickly led 
to diminishing returns, and the tomato pickers still lived in dire 
economic circumstances.167 It is in this liminal space that the CIW 
realized that the brands at the top of their supply chains not only 
incidentally benefited from their suffering, but drove it.168 It is also 
in this space that the CIW launched the FFP. 
Once the CIW discovered what would become a foundational 
aspect of WSR Agreements, namely that the same top-down 
pressure that drove employers to commit abuses, could be utilized 
to coerce employers into protecting labor rights (a realization that 
is codified in the third and fourth principles promulgated by the 
Network169), it shifted its focus from the stagnating, traditional 
labor strikes and stoppages to an attack on the entire supply 
 
163. See Brecher et al., supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
164. See BRUDNEY, supra note 40, at 364; see also 29 U.S.C. § 152 (The term 
“employee . . . shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer . . . ); In 
Re Cervantes, 87 NLRB 877, 880 (1949) (noting the NLRA does not consider agricultural 
workers to be “employees” under the Act). 
165. See Greg Asbed & Sean Sellers, The Fair Food Program: Comprehensive, Verifiable 
and Sustainable Change for Farmworkers, 16 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 39, 43 (2013). 
166. See id. 
167. See id. 
168. See Asbed & Hitov, supra note 1, at 505. 
169. See Statement of Principles for Worker-driven Social Responsibility (WSR), supra 
note 27. 
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chain.170 In 2001, the CIW transitioned its resistance from local 
Floridian growers to national brands by boldly declaring “Taco Bell 
makes farmworkers poor.”171 Even bolder than this language was 
the boycott that accompanied it: the CIW called for a boycott of 
Taco Bell until the working conditions in Immokalee were 
ameliorated.172 By targeting the top of the supply chain, the CIW 
was quickly able to garner national support—largely from 
students—greatly expanding its reach beyond Immokalee.173 
These “Student/Farmworker Alliance” chapters boycotted and 
drove Taco Bell from college campuses until 2005.174 That year, 
Yum Brands, the parent company of Taco Bell, agreed to the 
demands of the CIW and signed the first Fair Food Agreement 
(“FFA”).175 In this FFA, Taco Bell agreed to pay one penny more per 
pound of tomatoes to increase wages and further agreed to adjust 
its supply chain to buy from growers that complied with a to-be-
developed code of conduct.176 By 2012, ten more multibillion-
dollar food corporations had followed suit and by 2017 a total of 
fourteen companies have signed an FFA.177 These companies range 
from fast food chains (such as McDonald’s) to national 
supermarkets (Trader Joe’s) to general stores (Walmart).178 These 
initial FFAs could constitute a complete WSR Agreement, with the 
penny per pound program in place, major buyers contractually 
bound to raise wages, and conditions on the ground improving.179 
But even with these successes, the CIW was not done. 
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A major keystone of a WSR Agreement is its code of 
conduct,180 which necessarily goes beyond what the CIW achieved 
in the first FFA. However, it remained unclear if the CIW could 
develop the referenced code of conduct. In 2011, the CIW pushed 
for the creation of the Fair Food Standards Council (“FFSC”) an 
independent, third party entity that oversees the implementation 
of the FFP.181 The FFP is the successor to the initial FFAs. Whereas 
the FFAs were individual agreements without a larger plan, the FFP 
is an “industry-wide social responsibility program” that governed 
ninety percent of the Florida tomato industry within three years of 
its inception.182 It includes the penny per pound premium as well 
as a code of conduct.183 It is “singularly dedicated to enforcement” 
since it is legally binding, contains an effective and quick complaint 
process free from retaliation, and empowers the FFSC to conduct 
independent audits and dole out penalties for non-compliance.184 
Substantively, the FFP’s Code of Conduct requires compliance with 
all relevant labor laws, carries immediate penalties for violence, 
slavery, child labor and sexual assault, and also bans labor 
subcontracting, meaning that all farmworkers are full employees 
of the growers.185 The ban on sub-contracting farmworkers helps 
the FFSC oversee compliance as all workers covered by the FFP are 
known and easily informed of their rights under the Code.186 The 
FFP’s influence on the concept briefs published by the Network is 
clear as workers drove the drafting of the initial agreement187 and 
are involved in a continuous dialogue that reshapes the 
agreement.188 
While the Guidance Manual detailing the implementation of 
the FFP is only available to participants, the principal outlines of 
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the Code are public.189 It contains four parts: labor standards, 
violations, penalties for non-compliance, and guidelines for joining 
the Program.190 The first part codifies the gains discussed in the 
previous paragraphs, including the pay raise, the ban on 
subcontracting, and workplace safety.191 Evidence of worker input 
is clear as there are specified procedures to ensure safety, ample 
protections from retaliation, and regulations regarding company 
housing192—each responding to the substandard conditions that 
existed before the WSR Agreement. 
The second part outlines three tiers of violations (Article I 
through Article III).193 Article I violations include use of slave or 
child labor and carry an immediate suspension of the grower from 
the FFP. 194 Article II violations include using or threatening 
violence, sexual harassment without correction from the grower, 
retaliation, wage theft, discriminatory practices, negligent 
endangerment and employment of non-certified workers.195 
Violations of this Article can result in suspensions if the grower 
does not take specific remedial actions.196 These violations are 
reported and adjudicated through the complaint system. The FFSC 
staffs a 24/7 complaint line.197 The staff of the line is the same staff 
who audits, such that the independent inspectors are the same 
people hearing directly from the workers.198 The audits are 
substantial, as FFSC audits over half of the workforce at all 
seniority levels to generate a yearly report that details compliance, 
violations, and recommendations.199 Article III is a catch-all for 
violations and merely requires growers to develop a corrective 
plan of action with the FFSC, with no threat of suspension.200 
Regardless of the type of remedial or corrective action, FSSC 
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retains oversight throughout the process; nothing is left solely to 
the growers.201 
The third part divides penalties into two categories: grower 
penalties and supervisor penalties.202 Growers are subject to a 
sliding scale of suspensions, which go beyond a slap on the wrist.203 
The brands at the top of these supply chains are contractually 
forbidden from buying from suspended growers, so market 
consequences are immediate.204 These consequences result from 
the market power the brands wield over the growers.205 The 
brands purchase tomatoes at such high volumes that growers 
essentially must cater to the conditions of sale imposed by the 
brands.206 Before the FFP, the brands used this market power to 
depress wages and worsen working conditions.207 As the CIW 
changed the demands of the brands through organizing and 
boycotts, growers necessarily had to adapt their business practices 
to ensure they would not lose such high-volume customers.208 
Therefore, growers in supply chains governed by the FFP have 
strong economic incentives to satisfy the demands of the workers. 
Thus, the FFP is an archetypal WSR Agreement as it utilizes the 
market power of the brands at the top of the supply chains to 
pressure growers to protect labor rights.209 The penalties for 
overseers are similar; the FFSC maintains a list of supervisors and 
can suspend them for various lengths of time.210 Again, these 
penalties are mandatory and not left to the discretion of either the 
brands or the growers.211 
Brand entry to the FFP is a rigorous process. Potential 
entrants must be ready to comply fully the day they officially join, 
with implementation of relevant processes beginning prior to 
entry.212 In this sense, the FFP has achieved the goal of a WSR 
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Agreement;213 it has become an established and respected part of 
the rules governing the supply chain.214 The growth of the FFP 
demonstrates this. It is a testament to the CIW’s organizing ability 
and the enforceability of the FFP that within four years of the first 
FFP and a decade within the first FFA, it covered tens of thousands 
of workers across industries and states.215 
The FFP embodies the six principles of WSR Agreements as 
defined by the Network. Tomato pickers are at the heart of the 
regulatory process.216 The brands cannot avoid oversight; their 
records are checked monthly to ensure they do not buy from 
suspended growers.217 The penny per pound initiative somewhat 
alleviates the traditional downward market pressure that crushes 
workers.218 Growers cannot opt out of being suspended because 
they are unable to sell their non-compliant tomatoes to the brands 
at the top of the supply chain.219 The complaint system maintained 
by the FFSC quickly responds to complaints and is empowered to 
issue measured sanctions.220 While growers may be included in the 
creation of policies to ensure they are feasible and effective,221 the 
FFSC maintains total independence from both the growers and the 
brands in monitoring complaints to ensure that workers are free 
from retaliation.222 This structure ensures that the FFSC will never 
create rules that will cause capital failure, and also insulates 
workers from reprisal. Though the universe of workers covered is 
relatively small—only about 35,000 workers in 2015—223 the FFP 
demonstrates the feasibility of a WSR Agreement in principle. 
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B. The Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh 
Unlike the FFP, which formed after a long groundswell of local 
activism, the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh 
emerged in response to a series of mass-casualty building collapses 
and fires culminating in the Rana Plaza disaster.224 Even before the 
Rana Plaza collapse, workers faced multiple hazards in the 
Bangladeshi garment industry, as the country had suffered sixteen 
mass casualty events involving factory workers.225 Five months 
before the Rana Plaza collapse, a fire at the nine-story Tazreen 
Fashions factory killed 112 people and injured over 200 more.226 
Worse still, these discrete incidents occurred within the context of 
industrial exploitation.227 
Beginning in the 1970s, low labor costs, government 
deregulation, and privatization attracted ready-made garment 
factories to Bangladesh.228 Despite these factories employing 
millions of people and being a key part of Bangladesh’s export 
boom, its workers have long worked for low wages, without strong 
legal protections, and with minimum job security.229 Furthermore, 
the working conditions themselves are abysmal: workers work 
over fourteen-hour days, seven days a week, face rampant sexual 
harassment and discrimination, and work in “unsafe, cramped and 
hazardous conditions.”230 Between 1990 and 2012, over 1,000 
people were killed and 3,000 injured in over 275 “unsafe factory 
incidents.”231 
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These disasters were dwarfed by the carnage of the Rana 
Plaza collapse. 232 It was abundantly clear that the Rana Plaza 
building was faulty.233 The building was over-encumbered, stood 
on a landfill, and was built with shoddy materials.234 Local workers 
speculated that the owner’s political connections and personal 
corruption persuaded the local government from closing the 
building.235 Within three weeks of the disaster, the brands at the 
top of the affected supply chains announced the Accord,236 without 
requiring a years-long effort of worker campaigns analogous to the 
CIW’s campaign against Taco Bell. When it was signed on May 13, 
2013, it bound two international union groups (IndustriALL Global 
Union and UNI Global Union), eight IndustriALL affiliates and 
about forty-three clothing companies.237 The 2013 Accord was a 
five-year contract; by its expiration in May 2018, over 220 
companies had signed on and it covered millions of Bangladeshi 
garment workers.238 It also went beyond Rana Plaza and Dhaka, as 
it covered 1,600 factories across Bangladesh.239 Thus, the Accord 
started with at least nominal support from brands, unlike the FFP, 
which had to fight for its first signatory. 
The preamble to the 2013 agreement details the goals and 
ambition of the Accord. It is fundamentally a building safety 
agreement.240 It builds upon the National Action Plan on Fire Safety 
(“NAP”), an agreement between local manufacturers and the 
Bangladeshi government, which tried to fight unsafe conditions, 
but failed to garner support from brands at the top of the supply 
 
232. See Benjamin A. Evans, Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh: An 
International Response to Bangladesh Labor Conditions, 40 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 597, 
601 (2015). 
233. See id. 
234. See id. at 603. 
235. See id.; Jim Yardley, The Most Hated Bangladeshi, Toppled From a Shady Empire, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/world/asia/bangladesh-garment-industry-
reliant-on-flimsy-oversight.html [https://perma.cc/X9PK-MR2Y]. 
236. See id. at 606. 
237. See Achievements 2013 Accord, ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGL. 
(July 20, 2018). 
238. See id. However, the parties negotiated an extension in 2018, and it will be 
analyzed separately. See infra  notes 279-81 and accompanying text. 
239. See Evans, supra note 232, at 607. 
240. See ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, supra note 8, at 1. 
570 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:2 
chains.241 Furthermore, it “welcome[s] a strong role” for the ILO to 
guarantee that the signatories adhere to the Agreement.242 That 
the ILO plays a central role in oversight and administration of the 
Accord is one of the many ways the Accord commits to 
enforceability; at its heart there is third party oversight such that 
the brands themselves were not supervising the terms of the 
Accord. 
Under the Accord, local suppliers fall into one of three tiers.243 
Tier 1 factories are those that produce at least thirty percent of a 
signatory’s Bangladeshi output.244 These factories must submit to 
safety inspections, remediation, and fire safety trainings.245 Tier 2 
factories are long-term or major suppliers for a signatory that do 
not qualify as Tier 1 because they fail to meet the production 
quota.246 Tier 2 factories must submit to inspections and 
remediation, but not safety training.247 Sixty-five percent of goods 
bought from Bangladesh by signatories of the Accord must be 
produced by Tier 1 or Tier 2 suppliers.248 This ensures that the 
Accord is effective. Tier 3 factories are factories that represent ten 
percent of a company’s order (including occasional or one-shot 
orders) and must submit to limited initial inspections.249 Brands 
may not purchase more than thirty-five percent of their 
Bangladeshi goods from Tier 3 factories.250 If a Tier 3 factory fails 
its initial inspection, it is treated as a Tier 2 factory.251 
Furthermore, the Accord covers all suppliers in the chain, even if 
the brand does not know the supplier is being used, ensuring that 
the brand cannot escape liability by claiming ignorance of the 
supplier.252 The Accord provides that a single aggregated, regularly 
 
241. See id.; Evans, supra note 232, at 602. The NAP tried to achieve worker safety 
through public regulation. However, neither the brands nor the workers played a role in 
the creation or governance of the agreement. It was also smaller in scope than the Accord. 
See generally Evans, supra note 232, at 612-15. 
242. ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, supra note 8, at 1. 
243. See id. 1-2. 
244. See id. 1. 
245. See id. 
246. See Evans, supra note 232, at 608. 
247. See ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, supra note 8, at 1. 
248. See id. 
249. See id. at 2. 
250. See id. 
251. See id. 
252. See Evans, supra note 232, at 609. 
2020] WORKER DRIVEN AGREEMENTS 571 
updated list of all suppliers used by covered brands must be 
provided to the Accord’s steering committee or otherwise these 
brands would be in breach.253 Thus, there is direct market pressure 
on brands to ensure that the entirety of their supply chain 
comports with the agreement, as negligent or passive behavior can 
result in penalties. 
A steering committee governs the Accord. An ILO 
representative acts as a “neutral chair” of the steering 
committee.254 The rest of the steering committee consists of up to 
three union signatories and up to three company signatories, for a 
total of seven members.255 The steering committee is responsible 
for the management of the bureaucracy of the inspectorate but also 
chooses the Chief Safety Inspector and the Training Coordinator.256 
By mid-2017, the Accord had a staff of almost 250 people in 
Bangladesh and could conduct 500 follow-up inspections per 
month to ensure continued compliance.257 Thus, the workers have 
direct input into the oversight of the Accord, akin to the FFP, even 
if they are not solely in control of its implementation. The Chief 
Safety Inspector oversees the inspection of factories in accordance 
with individualized Plans of Action.258 Similarly, the Training 
Coordinator oversees the Health and Safety Committees at all 
factories.259 While the steering committee “strives to reach 
decision[s] by consensus,” it can act by majority vote.260 
Furthermore, the steering committee has original jurisdiction over 
any disputes between signatories arising under the agreement.261 
Importantly, parties may appeal decisions of the steering 
committee to binding arbitration, and parties agree to enforce any 
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arbitration award, as governed by the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.262 These 
awards can force a breaching company to directly pay for the 
changes needed to bring a supplier into compliance.263 This is a 
level of enforcement that is generally not found in traditional CSR 
or MSI agreements.264 
Like the FFP, a strict, structured, independent inspection 
system governs compliance. Inspections can either be done 
internally or through a steering committee-approved inspector.265 
However, internal inspections must be made available to the 
Inspector and are held to the same standard as those done under 
color of the agreement.266 These internal inspections do not 
replace the reporting system, so the Accord merely advises 
suppliers to inspect complaints pursuant to the Accord and 
previously approved internal mechanisms.267 Furthermore, the 
Inspector will hold companies with compliant internal inspections 
to those standards in the future.268 All inspection reports produced 
by the Safety Inspector (including the reports of compliant internal 
inspections) are made public within six weeks of the inspection, 
while all signing parties are immediately informed of “severe and 
imminent danger[s].”269 If a Safety Inspector finds noncompliance, 
the Accord empowers them to issue corrective orders mandating 
actions the supplier needs to take, corresponding to the violating 
supplier’s tier ranking. A public, mandatory, and time-bound 
schedule governs the completion corrective actions.270 
Importantly, should a factory require closing to complete 
renovations, the supplier may not fire any workers and must keep 
them on payroll so long as the closing is less than six months.271 
Furthermore, suppliers must work together to give workers 
terminated incidental to the Accord preferential treatment at other 
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covered suppliers.272 These provisions of the Accord provide 
incredible employment protections unseen in traditional forms of 
private regulation. Furthermore, it is improper retaliation to take 
adverse employment actions against a worker who, in good faith, 
refuses to complete unsafe work.273 
However, the Accord does not only impose obligations on 
suppliers; they also receive benefits. The clearest benefit is that 
compliant suppliers can sell their goods to the brands at the top of 
the supply chain.274 Furthermore, the brands agree to work with 
Tier 1 and Tier 2 factories to ensure that the cost of compliance 
does not result in economic ruin for suppliers.275 They also agree 
to maintain pre-Accord order volumes for the first two years of 
coverage.276 Akin to the penny per pound premium, signatory 
companies fund the bureaucracy of the Accord.277 Capped at 
US$500,000 per year, companies must pay a fee proportional to the 
volume of garment goods they buy from Bangladeshi suppliers.278 
The 2013 Accords expired in 2018. However, the parties 
negotiated a 2018 Transition Accord, which extends the agreement 
through May 31, 2021.279 This Transition Accord extends most of 
the 2013 Accord’s provisions, but, reminiscent of the “Iteration” 
stage of the Network’s brief, adopts some changes.280 Most notably, 
the Transition Accord formalizes ways brands can end a business 
relationship with a supplier and exit the Accord altogether.281 
Brands can leave a supplier if the factory commits a “zero 
tolerance” violation or if they have not sourced from the factory in 
the previous eighteen months and they agree to not return for two 
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years.282 Similarly, a brand may exit the Accord three months after 
giving notice, if they cease all sourcing from Bangladesh and have 
no other outstanding obligations under the Accord.283 
Interestingly, the Transition Accord includes a choice of law 
provision which specifies Dutch law.284 
The reason that the Transition Accord is a “transition” 
agreement instead of a permanent one is because it self-
terminates. The Accord sought to protect workers unprotected by 
the contemporary labor law regime.285 The Transition Accord 
reveals that a secondary goal was to help Bangladesh develop 
effective labor regulations.286 At the end of the Transition Acord, 
the steering committee is supposed to hand off its work to an ILO-
supported national regulatory body to ensure perpetual 
protections.287 A year and half before expiration, the steering 
committee will evaluate the purported regulatory body.288 If 
competent, the Accord expires, if not, the Accord lasts an additional 
year.289 Furthermore, the steering committee has the authority to 
terminate the Accord prematurely if there is an adequate 
regulatory body in place before May 31, 2021.290 Part IV of this 
Note evaluates the Accord’s limited success on this front.291 
As with the FFP, the Accord meets the six principles of WSR 
Agreements as defined by the WSR Network. Garment workers are 
the primary instigators of the regulatory process.292 The brands 
cannot avoid oversight as the safety inspections are carried out by 
an independent and public process that responds directly to 
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workers’ concerns, ensures compliance, and involves an 
organization that can issue penalties.293 The incentives and 
penalties authorized by the Accord ensure there is adequate 
market pressure to compel compliance.294 Supplier factories 
cannot refuse to implement safety measures because, if they 
refuse, they would be cut out of the supply chains of signatory 
companies.295 The oversight system governed by the steering 
council quickly responds to complaints, issues corrective action, 
and can award enforceable damages.296 Lastly, the steering 
committee maintains total independence from specific brands as 
well as the supplier factories.297 Unlike the FFP, the Accord covers 
a large population of workers. As of October 1, 2019, the Accord 
covered approximately 1,649 factories and 2,387,355 workers.298 
Thus, the Accord serves as proof that the framework pioneered by 
the CIW can be implemented on a much larger scale. 
Furthermore, workers can compare the characteristics of a 
WSR Agreement in the Bangladesh garment industry with a more 
traditional CSR.299 The brands that were unwilling to sign onto the 
Accords formed the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety 
(“Alliance”) on July 10, 2013, about a month after the ratification of 
the Accord.300 As with other CSRs, the program was voluntary and 
workers did not play a central role as the Alliance relegated local 
unions to an advisory capacity.301 Defenders of the Alliance can say 
much of the Alliance mirrors the Accord and was a stronger form 
of the traditional CSR model,302 but critics argue that the few 
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differences make the two programs substantively distinct.303 The 
Alliance specifically recognized two employers’ organizations: the 
Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association 
(“BGMEA”) and the Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and 
Exporters Association (“BKMEA”) as key members of the Alliance, 
but failed to similarly recognize any specific workers’ 
organizations.304 The Alliance explicitly did not make the brands 
responsible for improved conditions as it recognized “that 
responsibility for conditions in Bangladesh ultimately resides with 
the local factory owners and people and government of 
Bangladesh.”305 The insistence on the separation of the suppliers 
and the brands was emphasized in a no-third party beneficiary 
clause.306 The Alliance’s agreement specifically prohibited non-
parties to the Alliance—i.e. workers and suppliers—from seeking 
to enforce its terms.307 The Alliance contained neither mandatory 
nor suggested penalties on the brands. It merely stated that the 
signatories will set penalties for non-compliance for suppliers 
within their own supply chain.308 The Alliance did require 
members to pay administrative fees, but did not mandate any 
further contributions.309 The rest of the operating budget was 
supposed to come from a nonobligatory loan program.310 The 
Alliance claimed that its agreement was enforceable because its 
board of directors could have expelled members who failed to 
meet their commitments.311 However, expulsion for failure to 
comply without any further sanctions was a specious punishment 
at best because no one would ensure that the offender was actually 
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making factories any safer. Furthermore, the Alliance expired after 
five years without enacting a replacement. 
Thus, the comparison between the Accord and the Alliance 
demonstrates how WSR Agreement models take a stronger 
approach to the rights of workers than more traditional CSR 
models.312 In fact, the Alliance meets none of the principles 
promulgated by the Network.313 There are direct asymmetries in 
key portions of these agreements. The Accord centers itself around 
the workers; the Alliance focuses on brands. The Accord creates 
third party rights and obligations; the Alliance does not. The 
Accord secures adequate funding to help achieve the goals it places 
on itself; the Alliance does not guarantee adequate funding. The 
Accord helped propagate a second agreement that responded to 
the needs of the first and is designed to help develop a Bangladeshi 
public regulatory regime; the Alliance does not achieve either goal. 
IV. WSR AGREEMENTS CAN EFFECTIVELY AMELIORATE SPECIFIC 
PROBLEMS BUT ARE NOT PANACEAS. 
WSR Agreements offer workers a new form of private 
regulation that, in the abstract, is legally binding and effective. 
Consequently, workers themselves must determine whether the 
abstract benefits in these agreements are realized in the 
workspace. Ultimately, the evidence demonstrates that WSR 
Agreements effectively ameliorate the conditions their creators 
intended them to address, but cannot serve to end all workplace 
abuse. Furthermore, as workers gain power in the workplace, their 
capacity to demand better treatment grows.314 Thus, the benefits 
accrued under a WSR Agreement give workers the space and 
ability to demand better treatment in other areas of the workplace. 
For example, after the implementation of the Accord, the 
Bangladeshi workers began fighting for a higher wage with limited 
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success, which is both an incredibly important goal and beyond the 
scope of the Accord.315 
This Part will evaluate the successes of both the FFP and the 
Accord, highlighting their benefits over other forms of private 
regulation. Next, it will discuss where the FFP and the Accord did 
not meet their goals. Further, it will highlight some outstanding 
questions, offer some preliminary answers, and encourage the 
creation of more WSR Agreements in the future. 
A. The FFP Has Achieved Great Success in Improving the Working 
Conditions of Farmworkers 
Both data and testimony suggest that the FFP is an efficient 
and effective program that has resulted in real change.316 The 2018 
Annual Report issued by the FFSC divides the implementation of 
the FFP into two phases: the first four growing seasons (2011-
2015) and the subsequent seasons.317 Phase 1 concerns 
transformation, raising workplace standards, and achieving 
compliance. Phase 2, consequently, was about solidifying these 
changes into the status quo and expanding the reach of the 
program.318 
During Phase 1, reported complaints steadily increased.319 
During the first year of the FFP, the hotline fielded 107 reports of 
violations.320 These reported violations peaked in the 2014-15 
growing season, with 524 reports to the hotline.321 However, this 
steady growth of complaints does not a reflect a failure of the FFP, 
rather it is a mark of success.322 The increase in complaints derives 
from workers’ awareness of the FFP, their confidence in its 
effectiveness, and its ability to protect them from retaliation.323 
After the fourth season, complaints dropped by a third and have 
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remained at that level (about 350 complaints per season) for all 
subsequent years.324 In recent years, both observers and 
farmworkers have said that the fields governed by the FFP are 
among the best working fields in American agriculture, especially 
compared to non-FFP fields.325 
However, it is not enough to merely give workers the ability 
to complain about workplace issues, these complaints must be 
investigated if not remedied. Fortunately for the tomato pickers, 
the FFP has promulgated effective solutions to these problems. 
One holistic solution—divorced from any specific complaint—
must be highlighted, because it effectively demonstrates the need 
for workers to drive the terms of Codes of Conduct.326 Tomato 
pickers are generally paid by production rather than by the 
hour.327 In other words, they are paid by the amount of buckets of 
tomatoes they fill, not the hours they work. 
Pre-FFP, there was significant controversy of what 
constituted a “bucket of tomatoes.”328 The growers insisted that 
the pickers “cup” their buckets, such that a “full” bucket would have 
tomatoes beyond the brim so that the filled bucket resembled an 
ice cream cone.329 Workers, unsurprisingly, wanted a full bucket to 
be a bucket filled to the brim or at least to be compensated for the 
excess tomatoes.330 A cupped bucket contains about ten percent 
more tomatoes than a non-cupped bucket, so growers essentially 
failed to pay workers for up to ten percent of the labor the workers 
completed.331 The FFP prohibits growers from requiring workers 
to cup their buckets.332 While growers initially significantly 
resisted this change, by the third season, ninety percent of growers 
complied with the standard, and in the sixth, the practice was 
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nearly eliminated.333 Presently, cupping is an infrequent request 
because the growers know that merely giving the instruction will 
incur disciplinary action.334 Importantly, before the FFP, the 
cupping controversy was not known to many of the NGOs or other 
third-party groups outside the industry.335 Thus, it is unlikely that 
an MSI or a traditional CSR program would have ameliorated this 
issue because they often lack the worker input that would highlight 
an issue like cupping as key.336 Fortunately, the FFP included the 
workers in designing the Code of Conduct, and thus it could rely on 
the specialized knowledge of the workers to implement a ban on 
cupping.337 
More generally, the FFP has a fairly high dispute settlement 
rate.338 The hotline does not screen incoming phone calls for valid 
complaints under the FFP, so necessarily some claims will not be 
germane under the terms of the FFP.339 However, growers have 
been increasingly willing to resolve these non-germane issues340 
anyway.341 In the first season, only fourteen percent of these types 
of complaints resulted in a resolution, however, that number has 
jumped to nearly forty percent by the end of the latest growing 
season.342 Similarly, each year a third to a half of all germane 
complaints are resolved.343 
Also, importantly, the resolution process is quick and gaining 
speed. In the first years, resolution times were evenly distributed; 
a third took under two weeks, a (smaller) third took between two-
three weeks, and a third took over three weeks to resolve.344 
However, by the latest season, nearly half of all complaints were 
resolved within two weeks.345 This significant increase gives 
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workers confidence that the FFP actually hears their complaints.346 
The independent auditing process contains similar trends. The 
first few years saw both probations and suspensions from the 
FFP.347 Both measures carry market consequences because the 
tomato market is fairly inelastic due to the perishability of 
tomatoes.348 Thus, even though the FFP only covers twenty percent 
of the market, it is hard for suspended growers to find alternative 
buyers.349 Under the watchful eyes of the FFSC, violence, forced 
labor, and sexual harassment have plummeted.350 The first six 
seasons saw at least one (and up to seven) reports of violence or 
threats of violence, however, in the latest season, there were zero 
reported incidents.351 Immokalee went from the “ground zero for 
modern slavery”352 in the late 1990s to a place where not a single 
instance of physical sexual harassment was reported in the 
growing season of 2015-16.353 
Wages have also skyrocketed over the life of the FFP. Before 
the FFP, growers engaged in routine wage theft, even beyond the 
cupping previously discussed.354 However, the Code of Conduct 
and the penny per pound premium have led to wage increases of 
20-35%.355 With the penny per pound premium, the FFP has 
recovered over US$270,000 in stolen wages and has ensured that 
100% of all participating growers comply with effective and 
accurate timekeeping systems.356 In gross, the penny per pound 
has passed along nearly US$30 million in wage bonuses to workers 
over the course of the program.357 The program generally 
distributes US$3.5 million a year; even in 2017-18 when Hurricane 
Irma greatly affected tomato harvesting, the program distributed 
just under US$3 million.358 
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Furthermore, the FFP and the CIW have served as direct 
influences on other WSR Agreements within the United States. In 
2017, migrant dairy farm workers in Vermont created the Milk 
with Dignity Program (“MD”).359 The MD covers 100% of Ben & 
Jerry’s dairy supply chain, includes a Code of Conduct, and is 
governed by the Milk with Dignity Standards Council (“MDSC”).360 
It came about after Vermont dairy farm workers met with 
members of the CIW and learned about the FFP.361 While it is still 
too early to evaluate the practical successes and failures of the MD, 
the Network has labeled its creation an early success story.362 
B. The FFP Has Had Limited Success in Changing the Larger 
Landscape of Agricultural Work 
Nevertheless, the success of the FFP does not mean that the 
agricultural industry has achieved perfect equity. The FFSC’s 2017 
Annual Report highlights what still needs to happen, even if these 
needs are outside the scope of the FFP. Importantly the benefits 
gained under the FFP have not spread beyond to firms not covered 
by the FFP.363 Thus, growers that are not covered by the FFP are 
free to abuse their workers as the workers have no means of 
protection.364 Furthermore, the FFP has been unable to reduce the 
market pressure that causes brands to seek produce from 
Mexico.365 Watchdog groups dedicated to sustainable agriculture 
have documented that brands that have not joined the FFP—such 
as Wendy’s—have switched from Floridian growers to Mexican 
growers.366 Mexican farmworkers are subjected to abuses that are 
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reminiscent of the abuse endured by Floridian growers in the 
1990s, with the added pressures of Mexican state violence and 
organized crime.367 Mexican workers who have worked in both 
Mexican tomato fields and FFP tomato fields have noted the 
tangible difference that the presence of the FFP has on the working 
conditions,368 which demonstrates why market forces drive these 
brands from Florida to Mexico. The lack of worker protections in 
fields not covered by the FFP drive the market price of tomatoes 
down, which in turn increases the pressure on domestic growers, 
even those covered by the FFP.369 While the FFP can stave off these 
pressures in Florida, it is unable—on its own—to change the 
fundamental market structure so that “it is more profitable to 
adhere to humane labor standards than to ignore them.”370 
C. The Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh Has Had 
Success in Improving Factory Safety 
Similarly, the Accord can boast several positive outcomes, 
however, the factory owners still imperil the lives of Bangladeshi 
garment workers. Perhaps the Accord’s most important 
accomplishment is that a mass casualty disaster has not occurred 
since the implementation of the Accord.371 The year of the Rana 
Plaza collapse, there were seventeen mass casualty events that 
resulted in at least five deaths and/or ten injured workers. Since 
the Accord, there has been no mass casualty event and the number 
of accidents that exceed this death and injury toll has stayed 
between two and five.372 Fortunately, the number of yearly 
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fatalities has never exceeded thirty. Through April 2018, the 
Accord inspected over 2,000 factories, with 1,631 of them 
remaining under supervision.373 85% of supervised companies 
have remediated numerous individual safety concerns, with 42% 
completing 90% of their remediation action plans.374 However, 
only 8% of factories have completed all the repairs which their 
remediation plans require.375 Similarly, the Accord has suspended 
ninety-six companies from the program, cutting them out of the 
supply chain.376 Understanding that the Accord started with almost 
nothing, the sheer number of actions taken demonstrates that a 
framework is developing under the Accord.377 Furthermore, the 
Accord has trained 2.2 million workers in safety, so that the 
workers are aware of safety hazards and are able to report them.378 
On these metrics, the Accord has achieved greater change 
than the Alliance. The Alliance has reported on the same types of 
statistics that the Accord has.379 After five and a half years, the 
Alliance covered just over 700 factories while actively supervising 
around 650 factories.380 It has trained about 1.5 million workers in 
workplace safety and about an additional 28,000 security guards 
in fire safety.381 The Alliance self-reports a high remediation 
rate,382 however, an independent assessment of the Alliance in 
2015 revealed that these successes may not be as complete as 
presented.383 Furthermore, in some cases, the Alliance relied on 
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reports generated by the Accord.384 They did so when both the 
Accord and the Alliance governed the same factory but the factory 
in question primarily sourced Accord members.385 The Accord 
never reciprocated this arrangement. Thus, this comingling of data 
makes it difficult to evaluate the Alliance independently of the 
Accord. 
Unfortunately, it is unclear whether suppliers focused on 
structural issues, such as those that led to the Rana Plaza collapse. 
Most of the improvements made by the suppliers concerned 
electrical issues, then fire hazards, with structural improvements 
being the least frequent.386 Over eighty percent of factories that 
had electrical cable and circuit breaker problems have remedied 
them.387 Ninety-six percent of factories that had locked gates have 
removed them, improving fire safety, but sixty percent of factories 
have yet to implement adequate fire detection and alarm 
systems.388 One third of relevant factories have failed to implement 
a load management program, thirty-nine percent have failed to 
update their blueprints with undocumented construction, and 
forty-four percent have not insured against severe wind damage. 
While the progress made is commendable, more costly reforms, 
such as structural safety reforms, are the most likely to be 
outstanding or behind schedule.389 Supporters of the Accord can 
accurately claim that they have instituted a formal system for 
reporting, monitoring and overseeing factory conditions, but they 
cannot say they have completely achieved what the Accord set out 
to do. 
However, the Accord does have legal success that sets it apart 
from traditional CSRs. Under the Accord, an arbitration between 
two international unions and two undisclosed brands began.390 
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This represents a level of enforceability and legal repercussions 
beyond the traditional CSR model.391 Pursuant to the terms of the 
Accord,392 a tribunal was empaneled and made preliminary 
rulings.393 Two unions, IndustriALL and Uni Global Union charged 
two redacted signatories for breach of the Accord.394 Both charges 
accused the respective signatories of violating Articles 12 and 22 
of the Accord such that they failed to require their suppliers to 
repair facilities within the required deadline and failed to ensure 
that these repairs would be financially feasible for their 
suppliers.395 The tribunal ruled that the matter was appropriate for 
de novo arbitration after the steering committee tied 3-3 in 
evaluating the charges on the merits.396 Ultimately, the parties 
settled for undisclosed terms, but the Tribunal determined that the 
brands had fulfilled their terms of the settlement.397 It is a 
significant victory for the feasibility of the WSR Agreement 
model398 that the parties under the Accord could undergo 
arbitration and enforce a binding settlement. Under the traditional 
voluntarist CSR model,399 or even the Alliance, it is unlikely that the 
unions would have received an enforceable settlement that 
presumably ameliorated the charged problems. 
D. The Accord Has Not Been Able to Ameliorate Other Problems 
Facing Bangladeshi Workers 
Unfortunately, the secondary goal of the 2018 Transitions 
Accord seems unattainable. Actions of the Bangladeshi officials, 
including questioning and dismissing the Accord, suggest that the 
government will not have the capacity or will to take over at the 
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end of the 2018 Accords.400 The government insists that it has a 
role to play in oversight but the Commerce Secretary has stated 
that the Accord supporters “are finished with their mission and 
they will go back to their countries.”401 The leadership of the 
Accord, unsurprisingly, disagrees and intends to hold the 
government, brands and suppliers to the terms of the 2018 
Accord.402 Experts familiar with the outstanding costs surmise that 
the government would need to invest US$1.2 billion to fix only 
current safety concerns, notwithstanding any future needs.403 It is 
unlikely that the Bangladeshi government is willing to make that 
financial commitment to protect workers. 
One major source of doubt of the Bangladeshi government’s 
commitment to worker protection has been its reactions to 
assertions of worker power in other areas. In tandem with what 
some characterize as their determined efforts to “expel the Dhaka 
office of the Accord” thus “ending the Accord’s locally-run 
inspection program and forcing the Accord to operate remotely,” 
the government has cracked down on other concerted worker 
activity.404 For instance, in December of 2018, workers engaged in 
largely peaceful wage protests and strikes.405 These workers 
struck in response to a new living wage issued by the government 
that amounted to less than a quarter of the minimum living wage, 
as determined by a coalition of garment worker groups.406 The 
response from both factory owners and the government was 
hostile. Factory owners fired around 11,600 workers, many of 
whom police arrested for participating in the strikes.407 Police 
responded to wildcat strikes by “using ‘water cannons, tear gas, 
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and rubber bullets,’ according to witnesses,” in violation of 
Bangladeshi law.408 Furthermore, Bangladeshi police perpetrated 
a wave of indiscriminate violence against the neighborhoods 
where garment workers tended to live, shooting rubber bullets and 
gassing residents.409 Later, both the government and the factory 
owners engaged in targeted campaigns against activist workers, 
illegally firing them and prosecuting them on trumped up 
charges.410 
Some may argue that an analysis of the Accord’s successes and 
failures does not require a discussion of the recent violence and 
that including it unfairly tarnishes the record of the Accord. The 
Accord itself tries to limit its purpose merely to ensuring workers 
are free from fires, collapses and other accidents.411 However, the 
2018 Accord expands the commitment to a “safe and sustainable” 
industry, “worker protection efforts” and the development of a 
strong Bangladeshi regulatory body.412 Thus, there is an implicit 
recognition that the Accord is a starting framework for workers’ 
rights more generally. Therefore, it is worrying that after five years 
of the Accord, the government is still so hostile to worker power.413 
So, while worker power has undoubtedly increased, the 
government and the bosses subject new worker groups to 
termination, violence and expulsion from the community.414 In this 
environment, it is hard to imagine that the Accord will be able to 
hand off its responsibilities to the Bangladeshi government in 
2021. Like the FFP, the Accord seems to have—at best—limited 
success in reshaping the status of workers outside of the terms of 
the agreement. Worse, the self-imposed termination of the Accord 
jeopardizes the gains made. In contrast, while the Code of Conduct 
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under the FFP is not a static document,415 the program does not 
self-terminate. The expiration of 2018 Accord will be critical to 
developing generalizable WSR Agreement standards. 
E. WSR Agreements Can Effectively Protect Workers’ Rights, But the 
Struggle Continues 
Even if WSR Agreements are not panaceas, the evidence 
demonstrates they are effective in protecting the rights of workers 
in a complex global supply chain.416 Moreover, these Agreements 
have achieved successes greater than traditional forms of private 
regulation.417 They have proven enforceable, even against giant 
brands like Taco Bell.418 They have governed huge portions of an 
industry, such as millions of Bangladeshi garment workers.419 They 
have centered workers’ demands and allowed for a level of 
precision unseen in CSRs and MSIs.420 
Nevertheless, there are many outstanding issues regarding 
their creation, form, and implementation. It is unknown if a self-
terminating WSR Agreement is destined to weaken over time and 
lose any gains it may have won. Similarly, the tradeoffs between 
settling for a self-terminating WSR Agreement and continuing to 
fight during initial negotiations to extract a permanent agreement 
remain. Furthermore, it is still undetermined what level of 
government hostility prevents a WSR Agreement from operating. 
Resolving these issues may reshape the fundamental principles of 
WSR Agreements. Currently, the Network’s principles are silent on 
how long a WSR Agreements needs to stay operational, but the 
Bangladeshi garment industry post-Accord may alter what 
advocates consider “necessary” in a WSR Agreement.   
Though the 2018 Accord is still operating, some of these 
questions have tentative answers. Presently, it seems that a self-
terminating WSR Agreement has several negative implications. 
First, it signals to hostile governments and employers that they 
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need only to comply with these new regulations for brief 
periods.421 While this may work in instances where building safety 
is a one-and-done event, it is hard to imagine any company 
maintaining high levels of internal investment in building safety 
without the market pressures of WSR Agreements incentivizing 
them. Second, it is almost impossible to imagine companies 
maintaining wages or benefits guaranteed by a WSR Agreement 
after it terminates. One of the FFP’s challenges is coping with 
market pressure coming from farms not covered by the FFP.422 It 
is highly unlikely that a penny per pound-type program would 
survive without a governing body such as the FFSC ensuring that 
the money is collected and distributed. 
Yet, the Milk with Dignity initiative shows the diffuse benefits 
of a vibrant WSR Agreement. Although the Accord may not have 
found much success in changing the attitude of the Bangladeshi 
government, a perpetual Accord could still inspire WSRs for other 
issues within the garment industry, or even WSR agreements for 
similar issues in other industries. As of now, workers and worker 
organizations should be clear-eyed about the substantial costs of a 
self-terminating WSR Agreement and perhaps should avoid them 
unless what is truly needed is a short-term commitment from the 
supply chain. However, if the gains made by the Accord fall by the 
wayside after it expires—or if it is constantly being extended 
through a series of subsequent transition accords—it may be 
advisable for advocates to have a longer upfront struggle and 
secure a perpetual WSR Agreement.  
Regardless of these potential shortcomings and diffuse 
benefits, it is undeniable that WSR Agreements like the FFP and the 
Accord have achieved concrete gains for previously unprotected 
workers. The success of the penny per pound program in the 
tomato fields and the level of investment into workplace safety in 
Bangladesh represent real change for workers,423 in stark contrast 
to the ephemeral promises of traditional CSRs and MSIs, like the 
promises on which Nike never delivered. 424 Furthermore, the WSR 
Agreement format ensures that workers themselves are at the 
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heart of the process, which means that they protect the needs and 
rights of workers in ways that CSRs and MSIs never can.425 
Therefore, WSR Agreements should become a global norm when 
protecting workers’ rights in supply chains. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Worker Driven Social Responsibility Agreements are a new 
tool in the fight for workers’ rights and have proven effective. They 
recognize the need to hold the tops of the supply chains 
accountable for abuses made by suppliers lower down the chain.426 
They improve the voluntary models of private regulation like CSRs 
and MSIs by imposing enforceable contractual obligations. These 
contractual obligations revolutionize the notion of private 
regulation.427 WSR Agreements can expand the universe of 
protected labor rights, granting protections to workers who 
remain vulnerable under their respective labor law regime. 
Whether this vulnerability stems from a gap in the law or the 
unwillingness of the local government to enforce the law, WSR 
Agreements provide workers a way to independently hold their 
employers accountable. The accountability also can reach a level of 
specificity often not found in national labor laws and never found 
in CSRs or MSIs.428 Furthermore, successful WSR Agreements build 
community within the confines of the agreement. As workers see 
the effects of these agreements in their workplace, they become 
more confident in their ability to bring complaints. 429 
The Fair Food Program and the Accord represent impressive 
models of WSR Agreements. The FFP has transformed the covered 
tomato fields of Florida from dens of slavery to paragons of safety. 
Under the Program, wages have soared, and violence and sexual 
harassment have plummeted. Within a few years of operation, the 
FFP expanded from Florida to Georgia, South Carolina and Virginia 
and to other products as well.430 While the FFP may not be able to 
stop the global shifts in market pressure, it has relieved workers 
 
425. See What is WSR, supra note 23. 
426. See id. 
427. See id. 
428. See id. 
429. See Dias-Abey, supra note 322, at 203. 
430. See BRUDNEY, supra note 40, at 370 (noting that the FFP has expanded to bell 
pepper farms in other states). 
592 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:2 
excluded from United States labor law431 from horrid conditions, 
granted them some power in the workplace and most importantly, 
given over 35,000 farmworkers432 a voice with which they have 
demanded to be heard. Similarly, across the world, the Accord has 
helped make thousands of factories safer for millions of workers. 
Since the Accord started, the number of workplace fatalities in 
covered Bangladeshi garment factories has plummeted. The 
Accord has extracted major financial commitments from the 
brands at the tops of the supply chains and invested in promoting 
workplace safety. Furthermore, the Accord has brought worker 
committees on health and safety—a potential precursor to 
formally organized labor—to firms which previously had no 
workplace democracy. While the future of the Accord is in doubt 
and the larger structural reforms remain delayed, the presence of 
the Accord has undoubtedly made the workday safer for a 
countless number of workers. By embracing these principles and 
following these examples, workers across the world can begin to 
use the power of the market to hold their employers accountable 
for workplace abuses, regardless of the existing labor laws. 
The struggle for workers’ rights is ongoing. The past century 
has seen dramatic changes in the nature of work. Currently, 
complex, global supply chains are sources of worker exploitation. 
The WSR Agreement model offers something to workers in a 
supply chain that CSRs and MSIs have not: the ability to hold those 
with power accountable for their abuses and the ability to use their 
own power as workers to guarantee their rights. There is hope that 
as more supply chains adopt WSR Agreements, there will be justice 
in the workplace. 
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